Signal: partly right, then wrong at the horizon that mattered. TSLA did fall after the short entry—unrealized reached +1.84% (~346) while open—but by the scheduled next-close exit it had reversed to 354.11, +0.36% above entry, so the close-to-close direction the rationale actually bet on was wrong. Timing: the fill at 352.83 was already ~1.3% below the prior close (decision context showed -0.95%), so some of the "deliveries loom" drift had happened before entry; but since the stock fell a further ~1.8% afterward, the data doesn't show the move was exhausted at entry—it shows it was intact and then fully retraced.

Exit is the dominant factor: the mechanical next-close exit gave back the entire +1.84% favorable excursion and booked -0.36% (-2.56 USD), landing near the -0.61% worst unrealized. The available move was more than five times the realized loss in the other direction; the time-based exit captured none of it.

Signal was right: the overnight-drift long gained +0.99% (605.8 → 611.81), and with the stock slightly red at decision time (-0.19% vs. prev close, -0.45% last 30m) the move had not already happened by entry — the fill was even below the prior close. The fixed next-close exit captured about three-quarters of the +1.33% best unrealized and never sat far from the -0.92% worst, so exit execution was reasonable rather than the driver of the result. Dominant factor: correct direction on a generic overnight drift; note the cited article is a comparative "which looks stronger" piece rather than a discrete M&A catalyst, and nothing here settles whether the news itself, as opposed to ordinary drift, produced the move.

Signal: Direction was right — PLTR closed above entry (186.84 → 187.42, +0.31%), and the best unrealized of +2.15% shows the long thesis had real upside during the hold. Timing: Entry was not late; price was down 0.26% from the prior close at decision time and the fill (186.84) sat below the prior close of 187.48, so no move had already been made before entry. Exit: This is the dominant factor — the fixed next-close exit captured only ~0.3% of a +2.15% peak, giving back roughly 85% of the available gain, though the data doesn't show when the peak occurred or whether it was reachable by any rule other than the fixed close-to-close exit. Note also that the "earnings" tag is attached to what reads as a price-prediction article, not an earnings release, so whether a genuine catalyst was in play isn't settled by the material here.

Signal: Wrong, though marginally — GOOGL closed the next day at 342.22, up 0.29% from the 341.23 entry, so the short lost; the article title ("one risk every investor should know") is too vague to judge whether it actually implied a bearish overnight thesis, and the data here doesn't settle whether the signal had any substance beyond the headline.

Timing: The stock was already down 0.58% from the prior close at decision time, so part of whatever bearish move existed was consumed before entry; relative to the previous close of 342.75 the next close was slightly lower (-0.15%), meaning the direction versus prev close was nominally right but the entry gave that edge away.

Exit (dominant factor): The fixed next-close exit is what defined this outcome — the position saw +3.36% unrealized (roughly $23 on 2 shares) and -3.25% at the extremes, and the mechanical close realized -$1.98, capturing essentially none of the available favorable move while sitting through a swing that was over 10× the realized loss in either direction.

Signal: Not settled here — over the roughly one-day window the trade was open, AMD went from +0.5% above prior close at fill to below prior close, so the bullish call didn't play out in that window, but the position was closed by a netting rule (outranked by an S1 short), not by the thesis failing, so whether the Helios/Vultr news would have moved the stock later can't be judged from this data.

Timing (dominant factor): At decision time AMD was ~604.1 (-0.61% vs 607.85 close), yet the fill was 611.07 — about 1.15% higher — meaning the pop happened between decision and fill and the trade bought the top of it. The exit at 603.52 is almost exactly the decision-time price, so essentially the entire -7.55 loss is the decision-to-fill slippage being given back.

Exit: The forced netting exit landed at -1.24%, close to the -1.42% worst and well below the +0.42% best, so it captured roughly the worst of what was available; it was a mechanical close, not a judgment on the trade.

Signal: Essentially a scratch, and the bearish call was weak — the catalyst (a competitor AMD/HPE order) is second-order news for NVDA, and price spent the trade mostly against the short (worst −0.99%) before drifting back to roughly flat; the +0.14% close is noise, not confirmation of direction. Timing: the fill (229.87) was ~0.8% above the decision-time price (~228.0), which actually helped the short, so a stale/late entry is not the story here. Exit: the exit captured essentially everything available — P&L (+0.14%) actually exceeds the logged best unrealized (+0.10%), which is internally inconsistent (likely sampling of the best/worst tracker) but either way there was no meaningful upside left on the table. Dominant factor: a thin, indirect bearish signal that never produced a real down-move.

Signal was right, exit was the dominant weakness. Direction called bullish and AAPL rose from 331.0 to 333.24 (+0.68%), so the signal held; the pre-decision context (+0.12% vs prev close, +0.18% last 30m) shows the move had not already happened, though the fill at 331.0 was ~0.5% above prev close, so roughly 0.4% of the move was lost between decision and fill — not enough to call timing the problem. The exit captured only about a quarter of what was available: best unrealized was +2.47% versus a realized +0.68%, so most of the gain was given back before exit (the worst unrealized of +0.28% also indicates the trade was never underwater, so risk was minimal). One caveat: the rationale is a truncated Dow Jones headline roundup that only mentions "Apple ..." — the journal doesn't show what the Apple item actually said, so whether the "earnings" basis was substantive can't be verified from this data.

Signal: The rationale is essentially empty — the cited headline concerns Cal-Maine and Apple, not META, so there is no stated META-specific bearish thesis; the price data while open (+0.72% in favor, -1.48% against, flat at exit) doesn't settle whether bearish was "right," it just shows a two-sided chop. Timing: META was already down 1.00% from prev close at decision time and the fill at 727.14 was ~1.6% below prev close, so part of whatever move was being chased had already occurred. Exit: The trade closed at a scratch (-0.01), capturing none of the +0.72% best unrealized and avoiding the -1.48% worst — the dominant factor is the unsupported signal (a headline unrelated to the ticker), with the flat exit being the incidental result of a directionless holding period.

Signal: Wrong. The rationale was bullish off a "what to watch" preview of Micron earnings (not a reported result), and the stock fell after entry, never getting more than +0.50% ahead and finishing -1.12% below the fill; the data here doesn't show whether earnings actually printed or how, so the thesis itself can't be graded, only its direction. Timing: The move hadn't happened at decision time (+0.11% vs. prev close), but the fill at 1075.67 was ~+1.0% above prev close, meaning the price ran ~0.9% between decision and entry and the trade bought the top of that pop. Exit: Captured nothing — the -12.08 USD (-1.12%) is at or slightly beyond the worst unrealized (-1.03%), so the exit was at the low of the trade's range, not a partial give-back from the +0.50% high.

Dominant factor: a wrong-direction signal, made worse by ~0.9% of adverse slippage between decision and fill.

Signal: Wrong over the hold — TSLA closed the trade ~1.1% above the short entry, and the rationale itself is thin: a comparative opinion piece ("Rivian vs. Tesla") labeled as earnings doesn't describe a fresh bearish catalyst, so the "FRESH/bearish" verdict looks like a stretch rather than a trade-worthy signal. Timing: Price at decision was flat vs. prev close (352.90), yet the fill came in at 350.03, about 0.8% lower — so a chunk of the downside was already gone by fill; whether that gap is slippage or a delayed fill isn't settled here. Exit: Poor — the trade was +1.05% at its best but was closed at −1.14%, essentially at the worst unrealized (−1.25%), giving back the entire favorable excursion. Dominant factor: a weak, non-catalyst signal, compounded by an exit at the bottom of the range.

Signal: Weak-to-wrong. The "bullish REPRICING" verdict was extracted from a headline that is explicitly two-sided ("$195–$210 breakout or $175 flush"), and the outcome resolved to the downside — the +0.90% best unrealized shows a brief pop, but no breakout followed. Timing: Entry chased — fill at 189.17 was already +1.18% over prior close and above the very $188 resistance the article named, so whatever move existed was priced in at entry. Exit: Poor — the trade gave back the entire +0.90% and closed at −0.93%, essentially the worst unrealized (−0.96%); the data doesn't show whether the exit was a stop or a time-based close, so I can't say if a tighter exit was available under the rules. Dominant factor: a non-directional headline treated as a directional signal, compounded by buying into resistance after the move.

Signal: the thesis was an indirect read-through (an HPE/Vultr order treated as bearish for SMCI), and the stock only briefly cooperated — it dipped as much as +1.30% in the short's favor before reversing to -0.90% against, so the direction was right for a window but never showed sustained follow-through, which is consistent with a weak, second-hand catalyst rather than a confirmed repricing. Timing: the stock had already dropped 2.54% in the 30 minutes before the decision and the fill at 41.02 was flat to the prior close, so a chunk of whatever bearish move existed had occurred pre-entry; whether that 30m drop was news-driven or just intraday noise isn't settled by this data. Exit: the dominant factor — the exit at 41.22 (-0.49%, -$4.80) captured none of the +1.30% that was available and landed closer to the worst point (-0.90%) than the best, turning a trade that was briefly right into a small loss.

Signal was wrong: the bearish call on the M&A headline didn't play out — AMD reversed and closed above the prior close (612.33 vs 607.85), so the "slip" the article described had already been priced in by entry (–0.68% from prev close) and the stock recovered from there. Timing and exit are secondary: the best unrealized was only +0.55%, so even a perfect exit would have captured little, and the –1.45% realized loss sits near the –1.70% worst unrealized, meaning the exit gave back nearly all of what was available. Dominant factor is signal — the direction was wrong, not the execution.

Signal: Effectively unconfirmed — after entry AMZN traded in a ±0.25% band (+0.28% / -0.23%), so the "bullish repricing" call neither played out nor clearly failed; there was simply no further move to capture. Timing: The move had already happened — the stock was +1.35% over the prior close at the decision point and the last 30 minutes were already slightly negative, so the entry at 249.88 bought the top of the news pop. Exit: The -0.23% exit landed exactly at the worst unrealized level, so the exit captured the bottom of a tiny range rather than the +0.28% that was briefly available; the data doesn't say whether this was a stop or a timed close.

Dominant factor: timing — the deal headline was priced in before the fill, leaving nothing for the long thesis to earn, and the exit then gave up what little range existed.